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Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. For the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a new class of
strategies has recently been described, the so-called zero-determinant strategies. Using such a strategy, a player can
unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the co-player’s payoff. In particular the player may act
in such a way that it becomes optimal for the co-player to cooperate unconditionally. In this way, a player can manipulate
and extort his co-player, thereby ensuring that the own payoff never falls below the co-player’s payoff. However, using a
compliant strategy instead, a player can also ensure that his own payoff never exceeds the co-player’s payoff. Here, we use
adaptive dynamics to study when evolution leads to extortion and when it leads to compliance. We find a remarkable cyclic
dynamics: in sufficiently large populations, extortioners play a transient role, helping the population to move from selfish
strategies to compliance. Compliant strategies, however, can be subverted by altruists, which in turn give rise to selfish
strategies. Whether cooperative strategies are favored in the long run critically depends on the size of the population; we
show that cooperation is most abundant in large populations, in which case average payoffs approach the social optimum.
Our results are not restricted to the case of the prisoners dilemma, but can be extended to other social dilemmas, such as
the snowdrift game. Iterated social dilemmas in large populations do not lead to the evolution of strategies that aim to
dominate their co-player. Instead, generosity succeeds.
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Introduction
Repeated games are among the best-studied objects in game
theory, and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma has stimulated
research on the evolution of cooperation for more than five
decades [1–5]. The prisoner’s dilemma describes a social dilemma
between two players, each having the choice whether to cooperate
or to defect. When both cooperate, they each receive a mutual
reward R, which exceeds their payoff for mutual defection, P. But
if one player cooperates and the other defects, then the defector
gets the highest payoff T, whereas the cooperator ends up with the
lowest payoff S. Thus, if the game is played only once (or for a
known finite number of rounds), then mutual defection is the only
equilibrium. However, when players cannot anticipate how often
the game will be played, cooperative solutions become feasible
[3,5,6].
Researchers from diverse disciplines have used the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma to discuss the potential of direct reciprocity for
the evolution of cooperation [7–19]. However, recently Press and
Dyson [20] discovered that the infinitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma also contains strategies that allow the manipulation and
extortion of opponents [21–25]. To show this, they first proved
that there are simple strategies, which only depend on the outcome
of the previous round, such that each side can enforce a linear
relationship between the payoffs of the two players. More
precisely, suppose player 1 applies a memory-one strategy
p~(pR,pS,pT,pP), where pi is the probability to cooperate after
yielding a payoff i[fR,S,T,Pg in the previous round (additionally,
such a strategy needs to specify a move for the first round.
However, for infinitely iterated games, the first round can often be
neglected). Moreover, assume that there are three constants a,b,c
such that p can be written as
pR~aRzbRzcz1
pS~aSzbTzcz1
pT~aTzbSzc
pP~aPzbPzc:
ð1Þ
Press and Dyson [20] showed that when player 1 applies such a
strategy against an opponent with arbitrary strategy q, then the
player’s payoff A(p,q) and the opponent’s payoff A(q,p) fulfill the
linear relation
aA(p,q)zbA(q,p)zc~0: ð2Þ
Since their proof required certain determinants to vanish, Press
and Dyson called such strategies p zero-determinant strategies. At first
sight, zero-determinant strategies might seem as a mere mathe-
matical curiosity [26]. However, their existence has several
surprising consequences. Press and Dyson [20] discovered that
certain zero-determinant strategies can guarantee that a player
always yields at least the opponent’s payoff. They showed that by
setting c~{(azb)P, a zero-determinant strategist can enforce
the relation
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where x~{b=a§1 is called the extortion factor [20,23]. Such
extortioner strategies p guarantee that the player’s own surplus (over
the maximin value P) exceed’s the co-player’s surplus by a fixed
percentage. In particular, when the the typical payoff relations
Pv(TzS)=2vR hold, the payoff of an extortioner is never
below the payoff of its co-player, suggesting that extortioners
would dominate any evolutionary opponent [20].
On the other hand, Stewart and Plotkin [21,25] considered a
generous counterpart to extortioners. Starting from
c~{(azb)R, they investigated zero-determinant strategists that
enforce the relation
R{A(p,q)~x R{A(q,p) ðÞ , ð4Þ
where again x~{b=a§1. With such a generous strategy, a
player can ensure that her payoff is never above the opponent’s
payoff. In [23] such players are called compliers. Although
compliant strategies seem to be too generous to succeed in
competitive environments, Stewart and Plotkin [21] showed that
compliers do surprisingly well in round robin tournaments, in
which the compliant strategy was outperforming all other
strategies (including the most prominent strategies All D, Tit for
Tat, Win-Stay Lose-Shift, and an extortioner strategy). Moreover,
as shown in [25], a large fraction of compliant strategies is
‘‘evolutionary robust’’, meaning that no mutant with another
strategy can have a selective advantage over a resident population
of compliers.
Zero-determinant strategies thus have remarkable conceptual
properties, but comparably little is known which of these strategies
would evolve in a natural setup. It has recently been argued that
extortioners are evolutionarily unstable [22]: since extortioners
demand an extortionate share from any surplus, two interacting
extortioners would end up with a surplus of zero. Moreover,
numerical simulations indicate that zero-determinant strategies in
general are disfavored by selection in sufficiently large populations
[23]. However, this does not preclude certain zero-determinant
strategies, such as compliers, to play an important role, as recently
demonstrated by [21,25]. To identify such important strategies,
researchers have focused on particular limiting cases of zero-
determinant strategies, such as extortioners, equalizers, and
compliers. Moreover, to investigate the dynamics of these
strategies, previous studies either had to resort to individual-based
simulations, or they needed to restrict attention to a finite subset of
representative strategies [22,23,25].
Instead, it is the aim of this study to provide an analytical
framework that allows to study the evolutionary dynamics of all
zero-determinant strategies. Constructing an analytical model for
the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is not
straightforward. Already for simple memory-one strategies, a
calculation of the resulting payoffs may become prohibitively
laborious (for an example see [22]). To derive an analytical model
of the dynamics, we will thus focus on an appropriate super-set of
zero-determinant strategies: the set of all memory-one strategies
that enforce a linear relation of the form (2), as in [25]. We show
that if all players apply such strategies then the payoffs and the
resulting adaptive dynamics take a remarkably simple form. In
particular, we find that populations either move to the edge of
compliers, or they move towards a neighborhood of unconditional
defectors AllD. In this process, extortioners play an important
role, as they can neutrally invade unconditional defectors, thereby
promoting the emergence of compliance. On the other hand,
altruistic strategies (such as unconditional cooperators) have the
opposite effect: they can subvert a population of compliers, giving
rise to the evolution of selfish strategies. Which of these strategies
gets the upper hand in the long run, critically depends on the
population size. While small populations favor the emergence of
selfish strategies, compliance succeeds as populations become
sufficiently large.
Results
In the following, let us focus on the set of all memory-one
strategies that enforce a linear relation between the payoffs of the
two players. As players cannot set their own score [20], it is
reasonable to consider only those strategies fulfilling Eq. (2) for
which b=0 (formally this means that we exclude the strategy
repeat~(1,1,0,0) from the set of zero-determinant strategies,
which is fully dependent on the initial condition). In the appendix
we show that this subset of strategies is then identical to the set
LR~fp[½0,1 
4DAl, s[R, Vq : s(A(p,q){l)~A(q,p){lg: ð5Þ
Instead of the three parameters a, b=0 and c, this specification
only requires two free parameters, l and s. Both parameters allow
an intuitive interpretation (see Figure 1). The parameter s gives the
correlation between both players’ payoffs. A factor sw0 means
that a player enforces a positive linear relation between the
payoffs, whereas for sv0, the payoffs obey a negative linear
relation. The parameter l, on the other hand, can be considered as
the payoff that a player would get against himself (see Figure 1).
We thus call the parameter l the baseline payoff, and we refer to s as
the slope of an LR–strategy (in fact, the slope s is just the inverse of
the extortion factor x).
We consider an iterated prisoner’s dilemma and make the
common assumption that the payoffs of the one-shot game fulfill
the relation TwRwPwS, and Rw(TzS)=2wP, such that
mutual cooperation is the best outcome and mutual defection is
the worst outcome. As payoffs then need to be in the interval
½S,T , and because memory-one strategies need to consist of four
probabilities, there are restrictions on the linear relations that a
player can enforce. In the Methods section, we show that a pair
(l,s) is enforceable if
PƒlƒR
{min
T{l
l{S
,
l{S
T{l
  
ƒsƒ1:
ð6Þ
For example, the setof extortioners corresponds to the set of pairs
(l,s) with l~P and sw0. The set of compliers is given by those
memory-one strategies for which l~R and sw0. In the following,
we study the evolution of zero-determinant strategies by considering
the dynamics on the (l,s)-plane. That is, we assume that each player
determines an enforceable pair (l,s) and then picks a p from the
corresponding class of LR-strategies. Depending on the player’s
performance in the game, the enforceable pair (l,s) may then be
adopted by others, a process that we will describe with adaptive
dynamics and individual-based simulations.
Adaptive Dynamics in Infinite Populations
In order to derive the adaptive dynamics on the (l,s)–plane, we
first have to calculate the payoffs for each player. While the payoff
Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e77886function for general memory-one strategies is highly non-trivial,
these calculations become straightforward for LR-strategies.
Suppose a player wants to enforce the linear relation (l1,s1)b y
choosing an appropriate LR-strategy p, whereas the co-player
enforces the pair (l2,s2) by choosing q[LR. Then the payoffs are
implicitly given by
s1(A(p,q){l1) ~ A(q,p){l1
s2(A(q,p){l2) ~ A(p,q){l2:
ð7Þ
From this, we recover the result that a player can set the co-
player’s score to a fixed value [20,27]: by choosing s2~0, player 2
can guarantee that the first player’s payoff is l2 (i.e., the set of so-
called equalizers corresponds to all enforceable pairs (l,s) with
s~0).
Excluding the two non-generic cases that both players enforce
the most extreme payoff relations (s1~s2~1 or s1~s2~{1), this
system of two linear equations has a unique solution for the payoffs
A(l1,s1;l2,s2) : ~ A(p,q) ~
(1{s1)s2
1{s1:s2
:l1z
1{s2
1{s1:s2
:l2
A(l2,s2;l1,s1) : ~ A(q,p) ~
1{s1
1{s1:s2
:l1z
(1{s2)s1
1{s1:s2
:l2:
ð8Þ
It follows that if both players have the same baseline payoff,
l : ~l1~l2, then their payoff will be l, irrespective of their choice
of the slopes s1 and s2. In particular, the payoff of a homogeneous
(l,s)-population is l. As a consequence, if we consider homoge-
neous populations, and if we assume that the populations move
towards the direction where mutants have the highest invasion
fitness, then the resulting adaptive dynamics [28–30] is given by
d
dt
s ~
L
Ls2
A(l2,s2;l1,s1)Dl2~l1~l,s2~s1~s ~ 0
d
dt
l ~
L
Ll2
A(l2,s2;l1,s1)Dl2~l1~l,s2~s1~s ~
s
1zs
ð9Þ
The first equation implies that the slope s remains constant
under adaptive dynamics. Nevertheless, the initial value of s
determines the eventual fate of the population: if individuals
enforce a positive correlation between payoffs (sw0), then the
baseline payoff l increases over time. Eventually, such a population
will thus yield the maximum payoff R, i.e. the population
converges to the edge of compliers, see Fig. 2. On the other
hand, for sv0 the population payoffs l decrease over time, and the
dynamics leads to strategies in the neighborhood of AllD.
Interestingly, although extortioners always outcompete their direct
opponent, the edge of extortioners is unstable, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. Along this edge, mutants with higher baseline payoff l can
invade. By giving in the extortioners’ claim, they are able to yield a
payoff that exceeds the payoff P that extortioners get against
themselves. However, this argument rests on the assumption of an
infinite population, such that the probability for an extortioner to
interact with a rare, but profitable mutant is zero. In the following
section, we therefore extend our analysis to finite populations.
Adaptive Dynamics in Finite Populations
Extortioners play a more prominent role in finite populations
[23], where pairwise payoff advantages have a stronger effect (see
also [14,31]). This is most intuitive when the population only
consists of two individuals; since extortioners outperform their
direct co-player by definition, extortion is expected to spread.
These observations suggest that a given extortionate strategy can
be stable as long as the population size is below some critical
threshold. To calculate this threshold analytically, let us consider a
homogeneous population of size N that enforces the pair (l1,s1).
From time to time, a player may mutate to a different enforceable
pair (l2,s2). If mutation (or exploration) events are sufficiently rare,
the strategy of the mutant goes extinct, or fixates, before the next
mutation occurs [32,33]. In this case, the fixation probability r is
the decisive quantity for the evolutionary dynamics. It can be
shown that such a process can be described with a modified form
of the adaptive dynamics equation; instead of asserting that
homogenous populations move towards the direction where
mutants have the highest invasion fitness, it is assumed that the
population moves towards the direction where mutants have the
highest fixation probability. In Imhof and Nowak [34] it is shown
that this direction can be found by calculating the adaptive
dynamics for a slightly perturbed payoff matrix (called the effective
Figure 1. Illustration of zero-determinant strategies for an iterated prisoner’s dilemma with T~5, R~3, P~1 and S~0. All graphs
show the possible payoffs of the focal player (on the horizontal axis) and the resulting payoff for the opponent (on the vertical axis) as colored areas
or lines. The colored points represent the payoff pairs for 103 randomly chosen opponents. (a) In general, as for example when the focal player
applies the win-stay lose-shift strategy p~(1,0,0,1), the possible payoff pairs form a convex polygon. (b) However, if the focal player applies a
compliant strategy, the set of all possible payoff pairs degenerates to a line with positive slope s, which intersects the diagonal at l~R. (c) An
extortioner enforces payoff relations that are on a line with positive slope s, intersecting the diagonal at l~P. (d) The strategy AllD~(0,0,0,0)
enforces a linear relation between the payoffs of the two players although AllD is not a zero-determinant strategy for the given parameters, as
described in the Methods section.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g001
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~ A A(p,q) : ~A(p,q){
A(p,q)zA(q,p)
N
, ð10Þ
The first correction term, A(p,q)=N means that individuals
cannot play against themselves, whereas the second correction
term A(q,p)=N corresponds to the competition effect in finite
populations. In our case, the adaptive dynamics for finite
populations becomes
d
dt
s ~
L~ A A(l2,s2;l1,s1)
Ls2
Dl2~l1~l,s2~s1~s ~ 0
d
dt
l ~
L~ A A(l2,s2;l1,s1)
Ll2
Dl2~l1~l,s2~s1~s ~
(N{1)s{1
(1zs)N
ð11Þ
Remarkably, the slope s remains invariant for all population
sizes. However, the dynamics for the baseline payoff l changes for
small N: in the extreme case of N~2, all trajectories in the
interior of the state space lead to the lowest possible population
payoff. For Nw2, a bistable situation emerges: if the value of s in
the initial population exceeds 1=(N{1), then the population
moves towards the edge of compliers (with l~R), whereas for
smaller values of s populations move towards a non-cooperative
equilibrium (with l~P). Therefore, larger populations promote
the evolution of cooperative behaviors, and in the limit of infinitely
large populations, N??, we recover the original adaptive
dynamics (9). The dynamical equations (11) also imply that a
given extortionate strategy can only be stable if sv1=(N{1),o r
equivalently if the strategy’s extortion factor x~s{1 fulfills
xwN{1. Thus, to be stable in a finite population, extortioners
need to be sufficiently demanding (xwN{1), whereas compliers
must not be too generous (xvN{1).
In order to confirm these predictions, we have simulated the
dynamics in finite populations for a pairwise comparison process,
where the probability to switch to the role model’s strategy is given
by a Fermi function [37,38]. We assume that mutations follow
Gaussian distributions around l and s and focus on the distribution
of strategies and on the distribution of payoffs. For N~2 we find
that the population clusters around the edge of low population
payoffs (see Fig. 3a), and the density function for the payoffs has a
single peak at l~P. Increasing the population size has a two-fold
effect (Fig. 3b and 3c). First, compliant strategies with
sw1=(N{1) become stable, such that the density function of
the population payoffs has a second peak at l~R. Second,
increasing the population size reduces the stochastic noise; as a
consequence almost all the mass is concentrated around the two
peaks l~R and l~P. As predicted by adaptive dynamics, and in
line with previous results [23], larger populations exhibit larger
payoffs. For example, payoffs for a population size N~100 exceed
the payoffs for N~2 by more than a factor of six.
Although extortioners seem to apply a fully selfish strategy, they
are important as they can act as a catalyst for cooperation, by
helping the population to escape from states with low payoffs [23].
Our adaptive dynamics formalism allows us to give an intuitive
explanation for this effect: under a local mutation scheme, a
population of AllD players can only be invaded by neutral drift, by
moving along the vertical line of strategies with l~P. For
cooperative strategies to have a selective advantage, the new
resident population needs to have a positive slope s (i.e., only when
the new resident applies an extortionate strategy, cooperation can
evolve). In order to confirm this catalytic effect of extortionate
strategies, we have removed a d-neighborhood around the edge of
extortioners from the set of enforceable pairs (see Fig. 4a; in [34]
this method is called a knock-out experiment). That is, only those
mutants are permitted that are sufficiently different from
extortioners. The result is surprising: although extortioners are
defined as strategies with the lowest payoff against themselves,
their exclusion reduces the average payoff of the population for all
population sizes Nw2 (Fig. 4b). This effect is especially
pronounced in larger populations; for N~100, Fig. 4b indicates
that it is almost impossible to reach a cooperative regime without
extortioners.
So far, we have assumed that a mutant’s strategy is close to the
parent’s strategy (which allowed us to use derivatives to
approximate the dynamics), and that mutations are rare (which
allowed us to focus on games between a resident and one mutant
strategy). Let us now weaken these assumptions and numerically
explore the impact of non-local mutations, and of different
mutation rates, respectively. In Fig. 5, we distinguish four
simulations, according to whether the mutation rate is high or
low (m~0:05 vs. m~0:001), and whether mutations occur on a
local or on a global level (mutant strategies are drawn from a
normal distribution around the parent’s strategy, vs. mutant
strategies are uniformly distributed over the set of enforceable
pairs). These simulations indicate that all treatments follow the
same pattern: average payoffs are close to the minimum P in small
populations, and they increase with population size. However,
Figure 2. Adaptive dynamics in the (l,s)-plane. The grey-shaded
state space represents the set of all enforceable linear relations that
fulfill the inequalities (6). The corners of this state space consist of the
payoff relations (l,s) that correspond to the five strategies Always
Cooperate (AllC), Tit-for-Tat (TFT, which starts with cooperation, and
then repeats the opponent’s previous move), Suspicious Tit-for-Tat
(sTFT, which starts with defection and then repeats the opponent’s
previous move), Always Defect (AllD), and an Anti-Tit-for-Tat strategy
(ATFT, which always plays the opposite of the opponent’s previous
move). Three special subsets of this state space are of particular interest:
(i) Extortioners are strategies for which l~P and sw0. (ii) Equalizers are
strategies with s~0 (iii) Compliers correspond to the edge l~R and
sw0. The grey line between AllD and AllC corresponds to the set of
linear relationships that can be enforced with unconditional strategies
(in particular it follows that all unconditional strategies enforce linear
relationships with a negative slope, see Methods section). The adaptive
dynamics for this system is surprisingly simple: orbits are parallel to the
l-axis; for sw0, they converge towards the edge of compliers, whereas
for sv0, they converge towards the left boundary of the state space.
Parameters: T~3, R~2, P~0, S~{1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g002
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occurs, the mutant strategy either takes over the whole population (with probability r), or goes extinct before the next mutation arises. This leads to
a sequence of residents in the state space, which is shown in the upper three graphs (the dashed line corresponds to the threshold 1=(N{1)). The
lower three graphs give the distribution of the resulting payoffs in the population. (a) In the extreme case of N~2, most players enforce a strategy
with baseline payoff l~P. In particular, extortion strategies can persist. (b) As population size increases, a bistable situation emerges: the population
clusters along the edges with (l~P, sv1=(N{1)) and (l~R, sw1=(N{1)). (c) For large population sizes, this implies that the edge of compliers is
(neutrally) stable, whereas the edge of extortioners is unstable. As a consequence, mean payoffs increase with population size. The figure shows
simulation runs for 105 residents for a prisoner’s dilemma with T~3, R~2, P~0, S~{1. New mutant strategies are randomly drawn from a
Gaussian distribution around the parent strategy (s~0:05). The invasion probability r of a mutant is calculated as
r~(1z
PN{1
m~1 Pm
j~1 exp({v(AM{AR)))
{1, where AM and AR are the respective payoffs of mutants and residents, and where v~10 is the
strength of selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g003
Figure 4. Extortioners facilitate cooperation. In order to study the impact of extortioners on the evolutionary dynamics, we have excluded all
mutant strategies that are d-close to the set of extortioners. (a) For the simulations we have used d~0:1, represented by the white area in the upper
left corner of the panel. (b) As a result, we find for all population sizes Nw2 that the removal of extortioners decreases the average payoff. This
decrease is particularly dramatic in large populations, N§50. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g004
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and treatments with non-local mutations. If mutations are local,
populations can be trapped in regions with a low payoff for a
considerable time, although distant mutant strategies would offer
an immediate escape. For example, we have seen that any strategy
of the form (l~P, sv0) forms a stable fixed point of the adaptive
dynamics. However, once we allow mutants to adopt any strategy
of the state space, mutants with s close to one and lwP can easily
invade (in fact, in Stewart and Plotkin [25] it is shown that in
sufficiently large populations, compliant strategies with s&1 can
replace any noncooperative zero-determinant strategy). Overall,
non-local mutations thus lead to a shift of the invariant distribution
towards more cooperative strategies.
Discussion
The set of zero-determinant strategies exhibits a fascinating
variety of possible behaviors, ranging from extortioners to
compliant strategies, and from selfish strategies to altruists. To
evaluate the evolutionary relevance of these different possible
behaviors, previous studies focused on particular subsets. Adami
and Hintze [22] demonstrated that neither extortioners nor
equalizers are evolutionarily stable, and Hilbe et. al. [23]
confirmed numerically that these two subsets are only favored
by selection if the population is sufficiently small. In contrast, as
shown by Stewart and Plotkin [25], large population sizes favor
the emergence of compliant strategies, which are evolutionary
robust (they can only be invaded by neutral drift), and which in
turn are quite successful in invading other strategies. However, this
focus on specific subsets of zero-determinant strategies comes at
the risk of neglecting other important subsets. Thus, here we have
systematically explored the space of all zero-determinant strate-
gies.
To this end, we have derived the adaptive dynamics for all
strategies that enforce a linear relation between the payoffs of the
two players. This set of strategies includes all zero-determinant
strategies [20] and all unconditional strategies such as AllC or
AllD (see Methods section), but not all memory-one strategies (for
example, it does not contain the win-stay lose-shift rule depicted in
Figure 1a). The focus on this strategy space allows us to describe
the evolutionary dynamics with an analytically tractable model.
The resulting dynamics in large populations is bistable and the
state space contains two neutrally stable sets. When the initial
population enforces a positive relation between payoffs (sw0), the
population is most likely to end up at the edge of compliers. This
subset of strategies shares the following three properties: (i)
compliers enforce a linear relation between the payoffs of the two
players, (ii) a population of compliers yields the maximum possible
payoff l~R, and (iii) compliers play a best response to themselves
(no strategy can yield a payoff higher than R when playing against
a complier, see also [24] for a characterization of such strategies).
However, compliers have one shortcoming: they can be neutrally
invaded by altruistic strategies (strategies that accept a decrease of
their own payoff to increase the opponent’s payoff, such as AllC
with s~{c=b). Such altruistic strategies give rise to selfish
behaviors, leading the population to a neighborhood of AllD.T o
escape from that neighborhood, extortioners play an important
role [23]: they can invade AllD by neutral drift and promote the
emergence of compliant strategies. Thus, the route from cooper-
ation to defection goes via altruism, whereas the route from
defection to cooperation goes via extortion.
It is natural to ask which of these dynamical results on the space
of all zero-determinant strategies are robust when we consider
evolution in more general strategy spaces, such as memory-one
strategies, or strategies encoded by a finite automaton (see, for
example, [5]). Further simulations suggest that our results hold
more generally: for Fig. 6 we consider the adaptive dynamics on
the space of all memory-one strategies (similar simulations are also
presented in [23,25]). The numerical results confirm our analytical
predictions based on the adaptive dynamics framework: extor-
tioners are strongest in small populations, whereas compliers
succeed in large populations. Note, however, that zero-determi-
nant strategists in general are disfavored by selection as the
population size increases. In fact, as our analysis suggests, a large
proportion of zero-determinant strategies only play a transient role
in the evolutionary dynamics. For most of the time, the population
applies a strategy that is close to one of the boundaries l~P and
l~R, whereas interior states are hardly visited. The dynamics is
centered around the edge of selfish strategies and extortioners, and
around the edge of compliers and altruists, whereas the
evolutionary importance of other zero-determinant strategies
seems negligible.
Our results on the adaptive dynamics of zero-determinant
strategies resemble the results for the evolution of reactive
strategies (i.e., memory-one strategies with pR~pT and pS~pP,
[5,28,34]). In both models, there are two regimes. There is a
cooperation rewarding zone where populations evolve towards an edge
of fully cooperative strategies (the edge of compliers, or the edge
between tit-for-tat and generous tit-for-tat, respectively). Outside
of this cooperation rewarding zone, populations move towards
lower population payoffs (ending up at a neighborhood of AllD).
These similarities are not a mere coincidence. Instead, for games
with equal gains from switching (when RzP~SzT), every
reactive strategy is a zero-determinant strategy [23] and thus
reactive strategies form a subset of LR. Conversely, we show in
the Methods section that any enforceable payoff relation (l,s) can
be enforced by a reactive strategy in this case. Thus, for games
with equal gains from switching, the space LR is essentially
equivalent to the space of reactive strategies.
Throughout this manuscript, we have focused on the dynamics
of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. However, only a few of our
results actually depend on the characteristic order of payoffs,
TwRwPwS. In fact, the only result specific to the prisoner’s
Figure 5. Average payoffs for the four different mutation
treatments. In rare-mutation treatments, the mutation rate is set to
m~0:001, whereas in frequent-mutation treatments the mutation rate is
m~0:05. Local mutations are randomly drawn from a Gaussian
distribution around the parent strategy, non-local mutations are
randomly drawn from the entire state space. The rare local mutations
correspond to the previous simulations in Figs. 3 and 4. All other
parameters are the same as before.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g005
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Eq. (6). For games that are different from the prisoner’s dilemma,
the geometry of the state space may thus be different, but the
dynamics on the respective state space remains unchanged. In
Figure 7, we illustrate this observation by considering the
dynamics of an iterated snowdrift game (which is defined by the
payoff relations T~b, R~b{c=2, S~b{c, P~0 with 0vcvb
such that TwRwSwP, see [39,40]). For snowdrift games we
observe that only a subset of extortionate strategies is feasible [41]:
extortionate strategies with l~P need to fulfill the requirement
s§(b{c)=b (i.e. the maximum extortion factor is
x~1=s~b=(b{c)). Moreover, only strategies that yield a baseline
payoff higher than l~S can enforce a payoff relation with
negative slope, sv0. As a consequence, any sufficiently large
initial population that yields a payoff less than S against itself can
be replaced by more cooperative mutant strategies with higher
baseline payoffs. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, this dynamics leads
to the edge of compliers, which can only be left by neutral invasion
of altruists.
Similar results may be feasible for social dilemmas with a
continuous action space, as for example considered in [42–46].
However, transferring our findings to the continuous case is not
straightforward. First, the existing literature on zero-determinant
strategies exclusively deals with games where the players can only
choose among two actions (either to cooperate or to defect), and it
is not obvious how the corresponding proofs can be generalized to
iterated games with continuous action spaces. Moreover, even if
continuous games admit zero-determinant strategies, one may
wonder which linear relations (l,s) these strategies can enforce. Is
there an upper bound on the extortion factor? Which payoffs can
be enforced by an equalizer strategy? The answers to these
questions are likely to depend on specific details of the benefit and
cost function, representing an interesting topic for future research.
Our results confirm that extortionate behaviors can only prevail
in small populations. In large populations, the evolutionary steady
state is increasingly biased in favor of cooperative strategies. This
may come as a surprise, as it has been shown that intermediate
population sizes are optimal for the fixation of rare cooperative
mutants in a population of defectors [14]. However, compliant
strategies do not need to invade defectors directly. Instead, in
sufficiently large populations extortioners always provide an
escape path to leave non-cooperative populations. More impor-
tantly, once compliant strategies are common, they are evolution-
ary robust [25], with the neutral invasion of overly altruistic
strategies as their only weak spot. Overall, compliance succeeds.
Methods
The Geometry of the State Space
Let us first show that the set of all strategies that fulfill condition
(2) coincides with the set LR, as defined by (5). If we multiply the
condition
s(A(p,q){l)~A(q,p){l ð12Þ
with some W=0, then we can relate (2) and (5) by the following
transform of coordinates
a~Ws
b~{W
c~W(1{s)l
ð13Þ
It then follows from (1) that a zero-determinant strategy p enforces
the pair (l,s) if and only if there is a W such that p has the form
pR~1{W(1{s)(R{l)
pS~1{W(s(l{S)z(T{l))
pT~W((l{S)zs(T{l))
pP~W(1{s)(l{P):
ð14Þ
Since all entries pi need to be in the interval ½0,1 , there are
restrictions on the pairs (l,s) that can be enforced by zero-
determinant strategies. For the parameters of the prisoner’s
dilemma, it follows by pP§0 and pRƒ1 that baseline payoffs l
need to fulfill the condition PƒlƒR. Again because pP§0 and
pRƒ1, we may then conclude that W(1{s)§0. As a consequence,
the requirement pSƒ1 yields sƒ1 and Ww0. Then pT§0 leads
to the restriction s§{(l{S)=(T{l), whereas pSƒ1 implies
s§{(T{l)=(l{S). In summary, we conclude that for all pairs
(l,s) that fulfill
PƒlƒR
{min
T{l
l{S
,
l{S
T{l
  
ƒsƒ1:
ð15Þ
there is a corresponding zero-determinant strategy p of the form
(14) such that p[½0,1 
4 (we only have to choose a W that is
Figure 6. Statistics for the stochastic dynamics on the space of
all memory-one strategies. Instead of taking the enforceable pairs
(l,s) as the evolving traits, we consider the adaptive dynamics on the
space of memory-one strategies p~(pR,pS,pT,pP), see also [23,25]. (a)
To assess the impact of zero-determinant strategies, extortioners, and
compliers, we record how often the evolving population is in a d-
neighborhood of these strategy sets, and compare this to their
expected abundance in a neutral process. A given strategy set is thus
favored by selection if its relative abundance exceeds one. Our
simulations indicate that in small populations extortioners are favored
by selection, whereas in large populations compliers are favored. (b) As
a consequence, average payoffs increase with population size.
Simulations are run for a sequence of 106 mutants. We assume that
mutant strategies are uniformly distributed over the space of memory-
one strategies, and use the parameters v~1 and d~0:1. The other
parameters of the evolutionary process are the same as in the previous
figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g006
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enforced by zero-determinant strategies are in fact all possible
linear relations that can be enforced in an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma with Rw(TzS)=2wP. To see this, we note that for any
memory-one strategy p we have:
1. The payoff pair (A(p,AllD), A(AllD,p)) is on the line between
(S,T) and (P,P), whereas
2. the payoff pair (A(p,AllC), A(AllC,p)) is on the line between
(T,S) and (R,R).
Thus, any linear payoff relation (l,s) enforced by some p[LR
connects the line segment between (S,T) and (P,P) with the line
segment between (T,S) and (R,R) (see also Figs. 1b–1d). A
straightforward computation verifies that any such linear payoff
relation (l,s) needs to meet the conditions (15).
The set LR is a proper super set of the zero-determinant
strategies. For example, the strategy AllD~(0,0,0,0) is not a zero-
determinant strategy in the general prisoner’s dilemma (it is only a
zero-determinant strategy in games with equal gains from
switching, i.e. when RzP~SzT). However, AllD[LR holds
true in all prisoner’s dilemma games. In fact, every unconditional
strategy (r,r,r,r) is an element of LR, with parameters
l ~ (1{r)
2Pzr(1{r)(TzS)zr2R
s ~{
(1{r)(P{S)zr(T{R)
(1{r)(T{P)zr(R{S)
W ~ (1{r)(T{P)zr(R{S)
ð16Þ
In particular, it follows that unconditional strategies can only
enforce linear payoff relations with negative slopes s. As previously
suggested, these values of l and s satisfy the inequalities (15) for all
r; any linear relation (l,s) that can be enforced by an unconditional
strategy can also be enforced by a zero-determinant strategy.
Given a triplet (a,b,c), the corresponding zero-determinant
strategy p is uniquely determined by (1). However, for a given pair
(l,s) there will generally be many zero-determinant strategies p that
enforce the corresponding linear relationship in (5) - one for every
W in (14). We call two strategies p,p’[LR equivalent, and write
p*p’, if they give rise to the same pair (l,s). To study the
evolutionary dynamics of LR-strategies, we consider the dynamics
on the space of equivalence classes LR=*. That is, we assume that
each player determines a pair (l,s) and then picks a p from the
corresponding class of LR-strategies. The dynamics is well-defined
in the sense that the adaptive dynamics does not depend on the
choice of the class representative p.
LR-strategies Versus Reactive Strategies
When payoffs fulfill equal gains from switching, RzP~TzS,
we can choose W~1=(R{Szs:(T{R)) such that the zero-
determinant strategies according to Eqs. (14) are given by
pR ~
s(T{l)zl{S
s(T{R)zR{S
pS ~
(1{s)(l{P)
s(T{R)zR{S
pT ~
s(T{l)zl{S
s(T{R)zR{S
pP ~
(1{s)(l{P)
s(T{R)zR{S
: ð17Þ
In particular, pR~pT and pS~pP, i.e. all resulting zero-
determinant strategies are reactive strategies. For such reactive
strategies it follows that for PƒlƒR the conditions 0ƒpRƒ1 and
0ƒpSƒ1 are equivalent to the conditions
{
l{S
T{l
ƒsƒ1
{
T{l
l{S
ƒsƒ1,
ð18Þ
respectively. From this, we conclude that for games with equal
gains from switching, all payoff relations (l,s) that can be enforced
by zero-determinant strategies (given by the conditions (15)) can
already be enforced by reactive strategies.
Figure 7. Zero-determinant strategies for the iterated snowdrift game (with b~2, c~1, and T~b, R~b{c=2, S~b{c, P~0). (a) The
grey shaded area gives the space of feasible payoff pairs in the snowdrift game. The three colored lines give three examples of possible payoff
combinations if the focal player uses a strategy that enforces a linear relation between payoffs. Unlike in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the slopeo f
AllD is positive, s~(b{c)=b. (b) The grey-shaded area depicts the space of possible combinations of baseline payoff l and slopes s that are
enforceable in the snowdrift game. A comparison with Fig. 2 shows that the state space differs considerably from the state space of a prisoner’s
dilemma game. However, the qualitative dynamics within the state space remains unchanged.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.g007
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